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Prison Labor Under State Direction:
Do Inmates Have the Right to FLSA
Coverage and Minimum Wage?
An increasing number of Americans are witnessing life
through the bars of prison cells. More than 450 of every
100,000 United States residents were confined in jails and
prisons on any given day in 1990 . . . .'

The federal government's "war on drugs" and other anticrime measures launched in the 1980s have enjoyed some success. A recent F.B.I. report revealed that our nation's crime
rate decreased from 1991 t o 1992.~While that statistic seems
t o provide a glimmer of hope to crimefighters-and t o Americans in general-considerable costs have accompanied the
government's efforts to control and deter criminal activity. In
fact, the billions of dollars spent on increased law enforcement
and prosecution have led to billions of dollars more being spent
on the incarceration of prisoners? As a result, the cost of
maintaining overcrowded prisons or building new ones continues to burden our society.4

1. Michael Tonry, The Ballooning Prison Population, in THE 1993 WORLD
BOOKYEAR BOOK392, 392 (1993).
OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEFT OF JUSTICE,CRIMEIN THE
2. FEDERAL
BUREAU
UNITEDSTATES,1992: UNIFORMCRIMEREPORTS5 (1993) [hereinafter CRIMEREPORTS].Unfortunately, the number of reported crimes still totalled 14,438,191 during this same period. Id. The F.B.I.'s crime index includes reported instances of
murder, non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault,
burglary, larceny, theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson. Id. Not surprisingly, with
the large number of criminal offenses still being reported annually, the number of
arrests and subsequent prison sentences is still staggering. See generally Tonry,
supm note 1 (describing the high rate of incarceration in the United States).
3. Tonry, supra note 1, at 394-95. In addition to the stepped-up efforts of
the war on drugs, harsher sentencing procedures and rising parole violations have
also contributed to the rising prison populations. Id. at 394.
4. Indeed, at the close of 1989, our federal prisons were already operating at
164% of capacity. Federal Prison Industries and Implementation of the Federal
Prison Industries Provisions of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1990) [hereinafter
Hearings] (testimony of J . Michael Quinlan, Director, Federal Bureau of Prisons).
Even so, the Federal Bureau of Prisons projected that the federal inmate popula-
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In addition to magnifying the obvious costs related t o physical facilities, such rapid growth in the number of inmates
creates significant management and control problems. To alleviate these problems, prison managers must look for ways t o
occupy the prisoners' time while minimizing costs. Partially in
an attempt to achieve this, the federal and state governments
have either encouraged or required participation in inmate
work program^.^ This is not a recent development. In fact,
"[tlhroughout most of the history of the American prison system prisoners have worked while incarcerated.'"
Proponents of inmate work programs claim these programs
have proven an effective way of reducing inmate idleness.' In
addition, prison industries and other work programs save costs
and earn profits which can offset prison expenses. The federal
government and some states have also used this revenue to
help support prisoners' families and to compensate crime victim~.~
Despite the positive aspects of prison labor, the goods and
services sold by prison industries necessarily take a share of
the market from related businesses in the private sector. Some
question whether prison industries and private industries compete on a level playing field, especially since inmate laborers
traditionally receive wages well below the state and federal
minimum^.^ Others charge that, in addition to giving an unfair
advantage t o prison industries competing in the market place,

tion would nearly double by 1995. Id. The trends of state and local correctional
institutions appear to be following suit. In 1991, state prisons operated at 131% of
capacity, with some states, such as California and New Jersey, operating above
151% of capacity. Tonry, supra note 1, at 394-95.
5. See, e.g., A m . REV. STAT.ANN. 8 31-251(A) (1992) (granting state prison
official authority to require hard labor from prisoners); UTAH CODEANN. 8 64-1316 (1992) (allowing state department to employ any inmate not otherwise incapable
of employment).
6. Abstract, The Modern Prison: Let's Make It a Factory for Change, 18 U.
TOL. L. REV. 51, 51 (1986).
7. Hearings, supra note 4, at 2 (testimony of Hon. Robert W. Kastenmeier).
8. Id. at 1. Prison labor serves other purposes as well. For example, some
see mandatory labor as a form of punishment, while others see it as a means of
rehabilitation. Josephine R. Potuto, The Modern Prison: Let's Make It a Factory for
Change, 18 U. TOL. L. REV. 51, 51 (1986). Such work programs can aid by teaching inmates responsibility and other useful skills, hopefully facilitating the inmate's
return to society. See GAIL S. FUNKE ET AL., kk3SETS AND LIABILITIESOF CORRECTIONAL INDUSTRIES7 (1982).
9. See FUNKE
ET AL., supra note 8, at 14-16. Indeed, remuneration sometimes came in the form of "good time" (reduced prison sentences) rather than as
wages at all. Id.
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such treatment also unfairly discriminates against inmate
workers.
In light of such arguments, some maintain that the time
has arrived to recognize prisoners as "employees" covered by
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA or Act).'' I n fact, a panel
of judges from the Ninth Circuit recently ruled that the Arizon a Correctional Industries should pay inmates minimum wages
according to provisions of the FLSA." This decision implied, if
not expressly held, that inmates working for and in behalf of
the prison were state employees, entitled to FLSA coverage.
However, when the case was reheard en banc, the Ninth Circuit refused to follow the panel decision.12
Nevertheless, a trend may be emerging. Although most
courts recently addressing the issue have agreed that inmates
should not be considered employees for purposes of the Act,13
no court since 1984 has categorically ruled out the possibility of
FLSA coverage for working prisoners. Congress and the Supreme Court have left no clear roadmap to guide the courts.
How should the courts treat working inmates? Should FLSA
coverage be extended to them? If so, in what situations should
they be covered? Did Congress intend such a n application of
the FLSA? If not, would Congress a t least approve?
This Comment attempts to answer these questions. Part I1
sets forth a brief history of the FLSA and traces the development of FLSA coverage of prisoners. Parts I11 and IV analyze
Hale v. Arizona 1,14 Hale v. Arizona 11,15 and Vanskike v. Pe-

p
-

p

lo.

29 U.S.C. $5 201-219 (1988).
11. Hale v. Arizona, 967 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1992), reu'd on reh'g, 993 F.2d
1387 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 386 (1993). The 1992 Ninth Circuit opinion will hereinafter be referred to as Hale I, and the 1993 Ninth Circuit
opinion will be referred to as Hale II.
12. Hale 11, 993 F.2d at 1389.
13. See Harker v. State Use Indus., 990 F.2d 131 (4th Cir.) (inmate not covered by FLSA), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 238 (1993); Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d
806 (7th Cir. 1992) (prisoners not entitled to minimum wage under FLSA), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1303 (1993); Miller v. Dukakis, 961 F.2d 7 (1st Cir.) (prisoners
not "employees* under FLSA), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 666 (1992); Gilbreath v.
Cutter Biological, Inc., 931 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir. 1991) (Arizona Department of Corrections not "employer* under FLSA). But see Hale I, 967 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1992)
(inmates working in state work programs considered "employees* of the state), reu'd
on reh'g, 993 F.2d 1387 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 386 (1993).
14. 967 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1992), reu'd on reh'g, 993 F.2d 1387 (9th Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 386 (1993).
15. 993 F.2d 1387 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc).
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ters,16 three recent opinions which consider arguments for and
against extending FLSA coverage to prisoners. Part V examines
the language and purposes of the Act as well as competing
public policy concerns in attempting to discern Congress's intent toward prisoners. Part VI proposes a new test for the
courts to apply in determining the "economic reality" of employer-employee relations. Finally, this Comment concludes
that the FLSA should not be extended to cover prisoners since
Congress did not intend such coverage and would likely not
approve such action, which undermines public policy regarding
the incarceration of criminals, and because the courts have not
yet adequately addressed the "economic reality" of working
prisoners.
11. THE DEVELOPMENT
OF FLSA COVERAGE
OF PRISONERS

Some scholars recognize the FLSA as "the original antipoverty law."17 As originally passed in 1938, the FLSA was an
attempt to combat the ill effects of the Great Depression."
Indeed, the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare
reiterated this same thought nearly thirty years later:
The Fair Labor Standards Act was enacted in 1938 to meet
the economic and social problems of that era. Low wages, long
working hours and high unemployment plagued the Nation,
which was then in the midst of an unprecedented depression.
The policy of the act, as set forth therein, was to correct and
as rapidly as practicable to eliminate labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living
necessary for health, efficiency and general well-being of
workers. l9

By establishing a minimum wage, Congress hoped to raise the
standard of living of low-wage workers and to increase their
purchasing power.20 By requiring increased pay for overtime
16. 974 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1303 (1993).
17. Robert N. Willis, The Evolution of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 26 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 607, 607 (1972).
LEDVINKA,FEDERALREGULATION
OF PERSONNEL
AND HUMANRE18. JAMES
SOURCE MANAGEMENT
249 (1982); CHARLESH. LIVENGOOD,
JR., THE FEDERAL
WAGE
AND HOURLAW6-7 (1951); Willis, supra note 17, a t 607. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the FLSA in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100
(194 1).
WELFARE,FAIR LABOR STANDARDS
19. SENATECOMM.ON LABORAND PUBLIC
AMENDMENTS
OF 1966, S. REP. NO. 1487, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1966).
supra note 18, at 249.
20. LEDVINKA,
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hours, Congress hoped t o reduce unemployment by making it
less expensive for employers to hire additional employees than
t o overwork existing ones." Finally, Congress believed the Act
would reduce labor disputes by increasing compensation in lowpaying jobs and cutting down long work days."
In fact, many of these same purposes remain part of the
FLSA today. Section 202 declares:
(a) The Congress finds that the existence . . . of labor
conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum
standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general
well-being of workers (1)causes . . . the channels and instrumentalities of commerce to be used to spread and perpetuate
such labor conditions among [American] workers . . . ; (2)
burdens commerce . . . ; (3) constitutes an unfair .method of
competition . . . ; (4) leads to labor disputes . . . ; and (5) interferes with the orderly and fair marketing of goods in commerce. . . .
(b) It is declared to be the policy of this chapter . . . to
correct and a s rapidly a s practicable to eliminate the conditions above referred to in such industries without substantially curtailing employment or earning power.23

Though these problems certainly do not stifle the economy as
severely today as they did during the Great Depression, scholars stress the importance the FLSA's enumerated purposes
have played in the Act's interpretation and subsequent amendment~.~~
Originally, the FLSA covered less than thirty-three percent
of the nation's work
While the Act affected less than
twelve percent of those initially covered, it still increased the
wages of roughly 200,000 employees.26Also, nearly 1,400,000
workers benefitted from shorter work weeks or overtime
pay.'?
Since 1938, amendments to the FLSA have served primarily to broaden its coverage. The most substantial inclusion of

21. Id.
22. Id.
23. 29 U.S.C.5 202 (1988).
24. LEDVINKA,
supra note 18, at 249; LIVENGOOD,
supra note 18, at 7.
25. LEDVINKA,
supra note 18, at 249.
26. MARYANNE Q. WOODET AL., FAIREMPLOYMENT
PRACTICES
AND STANDARDS 591 (1982).
27. Id. (citing William S . Tyson, The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938: A
Survey and Evaluation of the First Eleven Years, 1 LAB. L.J. 278 (1950)).
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previously excluded workers came in 1974, when Congress
extended coverage to almost all state and local government
employee^.'^ Presumably, the FLSA now covers all employees
unless Congress has specifically made such workers "exempty'
i n another section of the Act.ZgHowever, in spite of this presumption, most courts have held the FLSA inapplicable to
inmates. And despite numerous amendments to encompass
more workers within the Act, Congress has yet to specifically
address the situation of inmate workers. This has left the
courts to debate the coverage of this overlooked labor class,
relying on general presumptions regarding the FLSA and the
employer-employee relationship.

A. Traditional Refusal of Courts to
Acknowledge Inmates as Employees
Since the FLSA's passage in 1938, the Act has provoked
endless litigation by employers and employees alike. As a result, substantial case law now supplements and interprets the
Act and its amendments. Even so, debate regarding the definition of the employer-employee relationship continues. The Supreme Court has offered only general guidance, holding in 1961
t h a t the coverage of any given relationship hinges on the "economic reality" of the employment s i t ~ a t i o n . ~ '
Still, for more than fifty years workers in various employment situations have sought judicial declarations of "covered"
status under the Act. While the courts have been receptive to

28. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, sec. 6(a),
$ 3, 88 Stat. 55, 59-60 (codified at 29 U.S.C. fj 203). The Court, however, held the
1974 amendments unconstitutional in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833 (1976). When the Court overruled Usery in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), Congress quickly acted to again include
state employees. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-150,
99 Stat. 787.
29. See 29 U.S.C. $ 213 (1988) (providing an "exemption" from the minimum
wage provision for certain common employment situations, such as school teachers,
outdoor salesmen, babysitters, etc.); 29 U.S.C. fj 214 (1988) (providing special "exemptions" from minimum wages for learners, apprentices, messengers, etc.). The
Supreme Court has reasoned that "[sluch specificity in stating exemptions
strengthens the implication that employees not thus exempted . . . remain within
the Act." Powell v. United States Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497, 517 (1950).
30. Goldberg v. W t a k e r House Coop., Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 33 (1961). Since
this decision, courts have applied "economic reality" as the general legal standard.
See, e.g., Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 808 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 1303 (1993); Hale I, 967 F.2d 1356, 1364 (9th Cir. 1992), reu'd on reh'g, 993
F.2d 1387 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 386 (1993).
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many arguments in behalf of workers, they have traditionally
been reluctant to hold working prisoners in the same category
as other more "typical" classes of workers.
In 1948, Huntley v. Gunn Furniture CO.~'became the first
federal court opinion to address the issue of prisoners' rights
under the FLSA. On March 11, 1947, a group of inmates at the
State Prison of Southern Michigan filed a complaint seeking to
recover minimum wages and overtime c o m p e n ~ a t i o n Prison
.~~
officials had assigned the inmates to work on parts and assemblies of shell casings, which Gunn Furniture Co. (Gunn) then
supplied to the Ordnance Division of the United States War
D e ~ a r t m e n t Judge
. ~ ~ Starr rested the opinion on the fact that
no employment or compensatory contract existed between the
prisoners and Gum:
"It is difficult to conceive instances wherein an industrial
plant . . . 'suffers or permits to work' within the meaning of
the Act, employees with whom the plant has no contractual
relationship as employer and employee or as master and
servant."34

The court held that the inmates were not employees of GUM
within the meaning of the Act; instead, they were employees of
the Michigan prison i n d u s t r i e ~ . ~ ~
In 1971, the Sixth Circuit dealt a major blow to inmates'
hopes for recognition under the FLSA. In Sims v. Parke Davis
& Co.,S6 the appellate court denied the inmates the right to
recover minimum wages and other damages under the FLSA.
Instead, the court affirmed and adopted the district court's "detailed and comprehensive opinion."37
In Sims, Parke Davis & Co. (Parke Davis) and Upjohn Co.
(Upjohn) conducted clinical research on the prison premise^.^'
The inmates performed services for these companies, including
31. 79 F. Supp. 110 (W.D. Mich. 1948).
32. Id. at 111.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 115 (quoting Maddox v. Jones, 42 F. Supp. 35, 42 (N.D.Ala.
1940)).
35. Id. at 116. The court also rejected the prisoners' claim under an unjust
meruit] in the present case for the sole
enrichment theory: "[Tlo invoke
purpose of labelling the plaintiffs as 'employees' of defendant under the Act would
extend the doctrine and legal fiction beyond reason." Id. at 114.
36. 453 F.2d 1259 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 978 (1972).
37. Id. at 1259.
38. Sims v. Parke Davis & Co., 334 F. Supp. 774, 778 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
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janitorial duties, maintenance and repair work, clerical tasks,
and cooking.3gThe district court examined the "economic reality" of the inmates' working relationship with Parke Davis and
Upjohn by considering "the extent to which [the companies
could] hire, fire and control those inmate^.'"^ The court concluded that the inmates did not qualify as employees of Parke
Davis or Upjohn:
The economic reality is that plaintiffs are convicted criminals incarcerated in a state penitentiary. As state prisoners,
they have been assigned by prison officials to work on ,the
penitentiary premises for private corporations a t rates established and paid by the State. In return for the use of this
convict labor, the private corporations have relinquished their
normal rights: [i.e., the rights to hire, fire, or control the inmates] except in the most routine rnatter~.~'

Accordingly, the court found that the prison's control over the
inmates precluded the inmates from being employees of a private corporation.
Additionally, the dicta in Sims appeared even more damaging to inmate labor rights. The court clearly did not believe
that Congress intended FLSA coverage for inmates:
The setting of wages for incarcerated prisoners working on
assignment by prison officials requires the consideration of
many variables which are unique to that situation and which
directly affect government policy on rehabilitation of criminals. I t is unlikely that Congress considered any of those
variables a t the time i t adopted general legislation designed
to give employees the right to a subsistence wage."2

Subsequent cases over the next twelve years continued t o
deny prisoners FLSA protection. Most often, the courts would
find that the "economic reality" identified the state or federal
government, not the private corporations, as the inmates' "employer." This was usually not difficult for the courts to justify
because of the extensive control exercised by prison officials

39.
40.
41.
42.

Id.
Id. at 783.
Id. at 787.
Id.
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over working prisoners.43Such a showing ended a plaintiff's
cause of action.44
The Supreme Court never heard any of these controversies.
Even so, several of the circuits took turns cutting down inmate
claims. The courts would typically apply the same rationale as
in Sims, while continuing to express doubts as to Congress's
intent toward prisoners. In Wentworth v. S ~ l e m ?the
~ Eighth
Circuit proclaimed doubt that "Congress, [even] by the 1974
amendments, intended to extend the coverage of the minimum
wage law to convicts working in state prison ind~stries.'"~
Just six years later, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a district court's
conclusion that inmates were not covered by the FLSA in part
because "the Congressional concern in enacting the Act was
with the standard of living and general well-being of the worker in American industry, so that the extension to the prison
inmate was not legislatively ~ontemplated."~'
Nevertheless, after 1983, some courts began to apply a
different rationale for determining the "economic reality" of the
inmate-worker situation. Indeed, a refined test has proved
much more favorable to the inmates than the traditional rationale. This test, established in Bonnette v. California Health &
Welfare Agency:' still has vitality in several of the federal
circuits today.

B. Developments Since the Advent of the Bonnette Test
In 1983, the Ninth Circuit combined a number of generalized inquiries previously considered by other courts in determining the "economic reality" of working relationship^.^^ The
43. In some cases, the inmate plaintiffs would even name a government agency as the defendant. See Sprouse v. Federal Prison Indus., Inc., 480 F.2d 1, 3 (5th
Cir.) (holding that "a suit against an essentially non-proprietary government corporation is in essence a suit against the United States"), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1095
(1973).
44. At that time, Congress still had not extended the FLSA to government
employees-at least not successfblly. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
45. 548 F.2d 773 (8th Cir. 1977).
46. Id. at 775.
47. Alexander v. Sara, Inc., 721 F.2d 149, 150 (5th Cir. 1983). The court also
held that "there was no employer-employee relationship, because the inmates' labor
belonged to the penitentiary, which was the sole party to the contract with Sara."
Id.
48. 704 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir. 1983).
49. Id.; see, e.g., Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Assocs., Inc., 603 F.2d 748, 756
(9th Cir. 1979); Hodgson v. Griffin & Brand of MeAllen, Inc., 471 F.2d 235, 237-38
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 819 (1973).
'
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result was a more bright-line test for the courts, reducing the
need for a purely discretionary case-by-case analysis. Specifically, the courts would determine "whether the alleged employer
(1) had the power to hire and fire the employees, (2) supervised
and controlled employee work schedules or conditions of employment, (3) determined the rate and method of payment, and
(4) maintained employment records."50 Nevertheless, the court
cautioned that these "four factors . . . are not etched in stone
and will not be blindly applied. The ultimate determination
must be based 'upon the circumstances of the whole activity "5 l
Bonnette only involved "chore workers" in a state welfare
program.52 Even so, courts quickly began to adopt the
Bonnette standard for other determinations of "economic reality" under the FLSA. A year after Bonnette, the Second Circuit
became the first court to apply the test in a n inmate labor
situation.
In Carter v. Dutchess Community College:3 a New York
inmate (Carter) had worked in the prison as a teaching assistant for a local college.54 Carter conducted tutorial classes i n
business math for inmate students. For his work, Carter received wages well below the statutory minimum.55 The lower
court granted summary judgment for the defendants on the
ground that the prison officials, and not the college, had the
ultimate control over Carter.56 Against tradition, the Second
Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that "ultimate control"
'
the court applied
was not the sole dispositive f a c t ~ r . ~Instead,
the Bonnette test, stating that "an inmate may be entitled under the law to receive the federal minimum wage from an outside employer, depending on how many typical employer prerogatives are exercised over the inmate by the outside employer, and to what extent."58
0'

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Bonnette, 704 F.2d at 1470.
Id. (quoting Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 730 (1947)).
Id. at 1467.
735 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1984).
Id. at 10.

Id.
Id. at 11-12.
Id. at 13-14.
Id. at 14 (emphasis added). Carter was decided before the 1985

amendments to the FLSA, therefore, the states were not yet subject to the FLSA
provisions. Even so, the Carter court seemed reluctant to go beyond granting FLSA
coverage for prisoners working for "outside" employers. See id.
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Carter represented a major reversal in the judicial trend
which, until then, had the practical effect of absolutely precluding inmates from FLSA coverage. Now, by satisfying the fourfactor Bonnette test, inmates could argue that they were in fact
employees according to "economic reality." Carter led the way
for Watson v. Graves,sgwhich became the f i s t case to actually
grant prisoners "employee" status under the FLSA.
In Watson, two officers (the sheriff and the warden) of a
Louisiana parish jail operated and administered a work release
program.60The sheriff and warden would grant "trusty" status
t o certain prisoners and would allow these prisoners "to work
outside the jail for private individuals or companies.'"' This
would occur usually a t the request of the outside parties. As
part of the program, two inmates (Watson and Thrash) worked
outside the prison for a small construction business operated by
the sheriff's daughter and son-in-law (the Jarreaus). The inmates worked for $20 per day regardless of the hours
The Watson court applied the Bonnette test and found that
the Jarreaus clearly met the supervision prong of the test.63
The court also found that "Jarreau . . . had the de facto power
to hire and fire" and that the "Sheriff 'set' the rate of pay."64
The court ignored the record-keeping prong since no records
were kept.
Not surprisingly, the court held that Watson and Thrash
"were 'employees' of the Jarreaus for purposes of FLSA coverage."65 However, the facts of that case were unusual when
compared with the typical on-site prisoner work program?
The sheriff had operated the work release program t o directly
benefit his daughter and son-in-law and had violated state
policy regarding such programs.67At best, Watson should be

59. 909 F.2d 1549 (5th Cir. 1990).
60. Id. at 1551.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1554-55.
64. Id. In fad, the Sheriff had set the pay rate illegally under Louisiana law.
Id. at 1555.
65. Id. at 1556.
66. "Up to now this court believed, apparently naively, that in the last decade
of the twentieth century scenarios such as the one before us no longer occurred in
country or parish jails of the rural south except in the imaginations of movie or
television script writers." Id. at 1550.
67. Id. at 1557. The court stated that work release programs were meant to
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narrowly read to hold that prisoners who participate in a work
release program, completely unsupervised by prison officials,
may be entitled to FLSA coverage.
Since Watson, however, some courts have refused to apply
the Bonnette test to inmate labor situations. At one point, even
the Ninth Circuit refused to consider the Bonnette factors in
reviewing a case of prisoners working for the state department
~
of corrections. In Gilbreath u. Cutter Biological, I n ~ . , 6all
three judges voiced a different opinion?' Judge Trott's opinion, which was adopted as the court opinion, claimed that the
"economic reality" issue did not apply to inmates:
A review of the FLSA in the light of its evident purpose and
legislative history, conducted with an eye guided by common
sense and common intelligence, leads . . . to the inescapable
conclusion that it is highly implausible that Congress intended the FLSA's minimum wage protection be extended to felons serving time in prison. This is a category of persons . . .
whose civil rights are subject to suspension and whose work
in prison could be accurately characterized in an economic
sense as involuntary servitude . . . ."

Furthermore, Judge Trott concluded that the state's "complete
control" over its inmates was inconsistent with the "economic
reality" in a true employer-employee relati~nship.~'
Nevertheless, several courts now seem to recognize that
prisoners may have a right to FLSA coverage when they are
employed in the service of private businesses. Even more eye
catching is an emerging trend to grant prisoners a right to
minimum wages when they work for the prison or the state.
Judge Dorothy Nelson, who wrote a strong dissent in
Gilbreath," commanded the majority in a 1992 case which
held prisoners to be "employees" of the Arizona Correctional
I n d u ~ t r i e s .That
~ ~ panel's opinion, and its possible implica-

help inmates "earn wages with which to help support their families and pay their
fines." Also, "a portion of the wages earned by a work release inmate [was] to be
applied to his room and board, thereby easing the burden on the taxpayer." Id.
The sheriffs program met none of these purposes. Id.
68. 931 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir. 1991).
69. Id. at 1321 (Trott, J.); id. at 1328 (Rymer, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment); id. at 1331 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 1324-25.
71. Id. at 1325.
72. Id. at 1331 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
73. Hale I, 967 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd on reh'g, 993 F.2d 1387 (9th
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tions are examined in Part 111. Part IV then examines a Seventh Circuit opinion7*that seems written almost as a rebuttal
to Hale I , and Hale II, the en banc rehearing by the Ninth Circuit.75

A. The Facts
Hale I involved the consolidated claims of two groups of
inmates in the Arizona Correctional Industries (ARCOR) program.76 One group of inmates (Fuller inmates) performed a
wide variety of jobs in ARCOR enterprises, ranging from raising hogs for Farmer John meats to making license plates." To
work for ARCOR, the inmates had to apply to the program, be
accepted by the prospective department, and pass a security
review.78ARCOR placed all revenues in a revolving fund from
which it paid wages and expense^.'^
The only appellant from the other inmate group (Hale
inmates) worked as an office manager and clerk for a business
participating in the Inmate-Operated Business Enterprise
(IOBE) program.80 The IOBE was a division of ARCOR which
allowed inmates to run businesses and to market goods in the
private sector. The Department of Corrections (DOC) monitored
the businesses and credited the inmates' accounts with the
wages c o l l e ~ t e d . ~ ~
Both groups of inmates sued to recover minimum wages
under the FLSA and Arizona law. One lower court dismissed
the claim of the Fuller inmates, while another court granted
summary judgment against the Hale inmates.82

Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 114 S . Ct. 386 (1993).
74. Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S . Ct.
1303 (1993).
75. Hale 11, 993 F.2d 1387 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc).
76. Hale I, 967 F.2d at 1360.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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B. The Ninth Circuit's Panel Opinion
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit first upheld the applicability
of the FLSA to states.83 The court then turned to the critical
issue: whether the inmates were involved in a n employer-employee relationship with the state, as defined under the
FLSA.
The court's analysis first addressed the issue of whether
inmates could ever be employees. In so doing, the court expressly followed the well-settled principle requiring courts "to
define 'employer' and 'employee' expansively and to construe
exemptions narrowly."85 The court then recognized that Congress, in 29 U.S.C. # 213 (1988), had not specifically "exempted"
prisoners. This, the court claimed, created a presumption that
prisoners remained covered by the Act?
Furthermore, the court found that "[c]onstruing the FLSA
to include inmate workers is also consistent with the purposes
of the
Indeed, "[rlequiring that prisoners receive a minimum wage for their labor [even] furthers the goal" of eliminating "unfair competition between employers and between workers seeking employ~nent."~~
As a result of this analysis, the
court concluded that "Congress did not intend automatically to
exclude inmate employees from the protections of the Act."89
The court next turned to an inquiry into whether an employment relationship actually existed between the inmates
and the state agency." Because Gilbreath u. Cutter Biological,
Inc. had contained three "widely divergent views," the court i n
Hale I more or less ignored the prior opinion of Judge Trott."
-

83. Id. at 1361.
84. Id. at 1362.
85. Id. (citing Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S.
290, 295-96 (1985)).
86. Id. at 1363.
87. Id. The opinion quickly brushed over the importance of the FLSA7s purpose to provide a minimum standard of living. While most commentators consider
that to be the primary purpose of the Act, the court in Hale I concluded that it
was only "equally importantn with eliminating unfair competition. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1364.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1364-66 (analyzing the three opinions and explaining away the
court's holding (Judge Trott's opinion) in Gilbreath). Interestingly, Judge Nelson,
who had not joined Judge Rymer's opinion concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment in Gilbreath, actually applied Rymer's rationale in Hale I when that
application would result in an outcome consistent with Nelson's thinking. Id. at
1364-65.
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Instead, the court chose to apply the four-pronged Bonnette test
to ARCOR and the DOC.92
Applying the test to the Fuller inmates, the court found
that the state was responsible, through ARCOR and the DOC,
for (1) hiring and firing the inmates, (2) supervising and controlling the work, (3) determining the rate and method of payment, and (4) maintaining any existing employment r e ~ o r d s ? ~
In the case of the Hale inmate, the court sidestepped the
possible liability of the IOBE business, which was owned and
operated by inmates. Instead, the court reverted to a traditional standard and held that the state had "effective" or "ultimate"
control over hiring and firing, supervising, and paying the
inmates through ARCOR and the DOC.94
In essence, meeting the prongs of the Bonnette test proved
dispo~itive.~~
The Ninth Circuit panel effectively held the
State of Arizona liable for not paying minimum wages to state
prisoners working in the ARCOR program. In reality, the state
could not help but meet the factors of the Bonnette test because
of the absolute control it maintained over prisoners in all situations-not just those involving inmate labor. Furthermore, the
court never considered that, by statute, Arizona could require
inmates to "engage in hard labor for not less than forty hours
per week? Previously, courts had found this factor enough to
Clearly, the Hale I holding
disqualify the inmates' ~laims.~'
would have made it difficult for courts to ever justify not extending FLSA coverage to prisoners.
IV. PRISON
INMATES
NOTSTATEEMPLOYEES:
V A N S ~ K V.
E PETERSAND HALE V. ARIZONAII
Just two months after Hale I, the Seventh Circuit addressed the issue of an inmate's right to receive minimum
wages from the state." Although the court attempted to dis-

92. Id. at 1364.
93. Id. at 1366.
94. Id. at 1367.
95. However, failing to meet one or more of the prongs would not have ended
the inquiry: "failure to satisfy one of the factors is not automatically fatal to a
worker's claim." Id. at 1364.
96. ARE. REV. STAT.
ANN. $ 31-251(A) (1992).
97. See, e.g., Watson v. Graves, 909 F.2d 1549, 1553 n.7 (5th Cir. 1990) (recognizing that "when a prisoner is sentenced to labor as part of his sentence, his
labor belongs to the prison and is at the disposal of the prison officials").
98. Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
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tinguish its case from Hale I, it still felt the need to rebut most
of the arguments presented by the Hale I court.g9

A. The Facts of Vanskike
Vanskike, an inmate at Illinois' Stateville Correctional
Center, performed various work assignments for the prison.
Vanskike claimed to have worked "as a janitor, kitchen worker,
gallery worker" and other positions while incarcerated.loO
Vanskike also claimed that the Illinois Department of Corrections (DOC) did not pay minimum wages for his work.lO'
Vanskike filed a pro se complaint against the director of
the DOC. The district court, construing the complaint as an
FLSA claim, granted the defendant's motion to dismiss.
Vanskike appealed.'"
B. The Seventh Circuit's Opinion
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit first indicated that the Act
itself provides 'little assistance, and the term 'employee' does
not obviously include prisoners who perform work within a
prison."'03 The court also brushed aside the argument that
employees not specifically "exempted" remain within the Act,
since that argument "assumes that prisoners plainly come
within the meaning of the term employee^.'"'"^
The court also attacked the argument that paying prisoners minimum wages is necessary to f!u
lfil
the purposes of the
FLEX The court recognized that the primary purpose of the
Act in providing a minimum standard of living had 'little or no
application in the context presented. Prisoners' basic needs are
met in prison."'" In addition, the court rejected the argument
that the purpose of preventing unfair competition compelled
FLSA coverage of prisoners, claiming that Congress has already adequately addressed that concern by regulating prisonmade goods through the Ashurst-Sumners Act.'OG
1303 (1993).
99. Id. at 808-09.
100. Id. at 806.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 807.
104. Id. at 807 n.2.
105. Id. at 810.
106. Id. at 811 (citing 18 U.S.C. $8 1761-1762 (1988)). The court presumed
that since Congress passed the Ashurst-Sumners Act in 1935, Congress certainly
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Finally, the court declined to apply the Bonnette test,
claiming that
the Bonnette factors fail to capture the true nature of the
relationship for essentially they presuppose a free labor situation. Put simply, the DOC'S 'control' over Vanskike does not
stem from any remunerative relationship or bargained-for
exchange of labor for consideration, but from incarceration itself. . . . The Bonnette factors thus primarily shed light on
just one boundary of the definition of 'employee,' and we are
concerned with a different boundary.lO'

The court concluded that, in accordance with the "economic
reality," Vanskike was not an "employee" under the FLSA. '08
Furthermore, the court declared that "to the extent that [Hale
I] may rule that a prisoner working within the prison and for
the prison is an 'employee' of the prison under the FLSA, we
respectfully disagree with its concl~sion."'~~
While the Vanskike court attempted t o somewhat lessen
the effect of the Hale I decision, the Seventh Circuit still left
the door open for possible FLSA coverage of prisoners. The
court agreed that "prisoners are not categorically excluded from
the FLSA's coverage simply because they are prisoner^.""^
C. The Ninth Circuit's En Banc Opinion
The Hale I opinion raised eyebrows even within the Ninth
Circuit. In the latter part of 1992, that court reheard the case
en banc and issued a new opinion on May 4, 1993."' Specifically, the court indicated its need to "consider these questions
en banc to resolve the tension between [its] decision in
Gilbreath v. Cutter Biological, Inc., and the panel opinion in
[Hale 11."Il2
Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit adopted the Seventh
Circuit's view in Vanskike that the Bonnette factors did not
provide a useful framework for determining the existence of an

did not intend to render such a recently passed law superfluous when it enacted
the FLSA just three years later. Id.
107. Id. at 809-10.
108. Id. at 810.
109. Id. at 809.
110. Id. at 808.
111. Hale 11, 993 F.2d 1387 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc).
112. Id. at 1389 (citation omitted).

386

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I994

employee-employer relationship.ll3 As in Vanskike, the lack of
a free labor situation weighed heavily in the Ninth Circuit's
decision:
The case of inmate labor is different from [the Bonnettel type
of situation where labor is exchanged for wages in a free
market. Convicted criminals do not have the right freely to
sell their labor and are not protected by the Thirteenth
Amendment against involuntary servitude. . . . "Can these
prisoners plausibly be said to be 'employed' in the relevant
sense a t all?"
We think not, because . . . the economic reality of the
relationship between the worker and the entity for which
work was performed lies in the relationship between prison
and prisoner. It is penological, not pecuniary."'

The court next concluded that its decision that the inmates
were not employees "is consistent with the purpose of the
FLSA.""~ The problem of sub-standard living conditions
which the FLSA was designed to combat is simply not a concern for prisoner^."^ The court further determined that the
FLSA did not seek to redress unfair competition among goods
i n the marketplace, but rather unfair competition in the labor
market."' Although the court was willing to concede that a
certain amount of unfair competition may result from the use
of prison labor, 'hothing in the FLSA indicates that that fact

113. Id. at 1394.
114. Id. at 1394-95 (quoting Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 809 (7th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1303 (1993)). The Fourth Circuit appears to agree
with this rationale. See Harker v. State Use Indus., 990 F.2d 131, 133 (4th Cir.)
(quoting Vanskike and citing Gilbreath while holding that the FLSA does not cover
inmates), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 238 (1993).
115. Hale 11, 993 F.2d a t 1396.
116. Id.
117. Id. In support of this position, the court quoted President Roosevelt, President Roosevelt's Message to Congress on the Fair Labor Standards Act Way 24,
1937), reprinted in S. REP. NO. 884, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 ("And so to protect the
fundamental interests of free labor and a free people we propose that only goods
which have been produced under conditions which meet the minimum standards of
free labor shall be admitted to interstate commerce."), and the Supreme Court,
Powell v. United States Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497, 509-10 (1950) ("In [the FLSA],
the primary purpose of Congress was not to regulate interstate commerce as such.
It was to eliminate, as rapidly as practicable, substandard labor conditions
throughout the nation."). The court also concluded, like the Seventh Circuit, that
Congress "specifically addressed its concern with unfair competition in the products
market from prison-made goods in the Ashurst-Sumners Act." Hale 11, 993 F.2d a t
1397 (footnote omitted).
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alone should convert the relationship between prison and prisoner to one of employer-employee.77118
Finally, the Ninth Circuit recognized that other policy
concerns applicable to prison industries programs provide evidence that Congress would not grant FLSA coverage to prisoners working in such programs.llg "Correctional industries . . .
occupy idle prisoners, reduce disciplinary problems, nurture a
sense of responsibility, and provide valuable skills and job
training."120 Requiring prisons to pay prisoners minimum
wages without recouping expenses for their maintenance would
make these work programs economically infeasible. Accordingly, the court concluded that "Congress cannot have intended
the FLSA to impose a minimum wage obligation that would
jeopardize prison industries programs structured by and for the
For all these reasons, the Ninth Circuit declined to follow
the panel opinion in Hale I and affirmed the lower court's denial of FLSA coverage for the prisoners.lP Even so, neither
Hale II nor Vanskike went so far as to hold that prisoners are
categorically excluded from the FLSA. Instead, the courts limited their holdings to cases of "hard labor," when the prisoners
are statutorily required to work? Both courts failed to address several other factors and competing policy interests
which make it unlikely that Congress intended or intends for
prisoners to be covered by the FLSA except i n the narrowest of
circumstances.
THE FAIRLABOR STANDARDS
ACT-DID
V. INTERPRETING
CONGRESS
INTEND
TO COVERINMATES?

Part of the difficulty courts experience i n determining
whether or not inmate workers should be covered by the FLSA
has resulted from a lack of clear guidance in the Act itself, lack
of clear guidance from Congress, and the courts7failure to con-

118. Hale 11, 993 F.2d at 1397.
119. Id. at 1398.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1400. However, Judge Norris wrote a scathing dissent. Id. (Norris,
J., dissenting). Most of Judge Norris's arguments, as well as those of other proponents of FLSA coverage for prisoners, are examined in Parts V and VI of this
Comment.
123. See id. at 1392-93, 1395.
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sider some key policy concerns regarding the labor and payment of inmates.

A. Language of the A d
The Act defines the term "employer" as "any person acting
directly or indirectly in the interest of a n employer in relation
If that circular definition is not very
to a n empl~yee."'~~
meaningful, it is made even less so by the Act's definition of
"employee": "any individual employed by a n employer."'* Finally, the term "employ" merely "includes to suffer or permit to
work."lZ6 These broad definitions could include almost anyone
actually working in almost any capacity, even without expectation of payment. Indeed, under these definitions, the FLSA
should cover anyone suffered or permitted to work by a n employer. 12'
Congress likely intended broad coverage of the Act, but it
certainly did not intend absolute coverage of everyone.12' This
is evidenced by the list of "exempted" employees in 29 U.S.C.
$ 213. On the other hand, Justice Powell's language, indicating
that "[s]uch specificity in stating exemptions strengthens the
implication that employees not thus exempted . . . remain within the Act,"lZghas fueled the argument that because Congress
did not specifically exempt inmates in $213, Congress intended
their inclusion within the Act.130 This general assertion's
weakness stems from the fact that it presupposes that Congress contemplated inmates as employees under the Act when
listing the exemption^.'^' Logically, Congress would only exempt those naturally considered to be employees in the first
instance.
The plain meaning of the term "employee" also provides
little insight into Congressional intent. Perhaps Webster's
124. 29 U.S.C. $ 203(d) (1988).
125. 29 U.S.C. $ 203(e)(l) (1988).
126. 29 U.S.C. $ 203(g) (1988).
127. The federal government "suffers or permits" millions of Americans to work
for their employers of choice. Can all those workers consider themselves employees
of the federal government? Clearly, the definitional provisions of the FLSA should
not be read too literally.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 25-28.
129. Powell v. United States Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497, 517 (1950).
130. See, e.g., Hale I, 967 F.2d 1356, 1363 (9th Cir. 1992), reu'd on reh'g, 993
F.2d 1387 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 386 (1993).
131. See Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 807 n.2 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1303 (1993).
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Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary conveys what Congress intended, defining "employee" as "one employed by another [usually] for wages or salary and in a position below the executive
level."132 Nevertheless, Black's Law Dictionary recognizes
that "whether one is a n employee or not within a particular
statute [such as the FLSA] will depend upon facts and circums t a n c e ~ . " 'Accordingly,
~
little guidance for the courts can be
found in the actual language of the FLSA.
B. Purposes of the Act
In enacting the FLSA, Congress found the existence "of
labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and
general well-being of workers."134 According to Congress, perpetuation of this first problem led to other problems such a s
unfair competition and labor disputes.'" Congress then declared that the Act was intended "to correct and as rapidly a s
practicable to eliminate [those] conditions . . . without substantially curtailing employment or earning power."136 None of
these purposes, however, compels a conclusion that inmates
must be paid minimum wages under the Act.
1. Sub-standard 1iving conditions

The Congress, judges, and other commentators generally
agree that the need to improve Americans' standard of living
provided the primary impetus for passage of the FLSA.'~'
Nevertheless, "the problem of substandard living conditions . . .
does not apply to prisoners, for whom clothing, shelter, and
--

132. WEBSTER'SNINTHNEW COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY
408 (1990). Interestingly,
Merriam-Webster's concept of an employee parallels that of Congress in many respects. Congress first chose to exempt "any employee employed in a bona fide
executive, administrative, or professional capacity" from the minimum wage provisions. 29 U.S.C. $ 213(a)(l) (1988). This exemption also raises some speculation as
to the treatment of inmates who labor in executive positions-as in the case of selected inmates in Arizona's IOBE program. Hale I, 967 F.2d 1356, 1360 (9th Cir.
1992), rev'd on reh'g, 993 F.2d 1387 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
386 (1993).
133. BLACK'SLAWDICTIONARY
525 (6th ed. 1990).
134. 29 U.S.C. $ 202(a) (1988).
135. Id.
136. Id. $ 20203).
137. See supra text accompanying notes 17-22; see also Hale 11, 993 F.2d 1387,
1396 (9th Cir. 1993) (agreeing that sub-standard living conditions were the primary
concern of the FLSA).
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food are provided by the prison."138 Since the main purpose of
the Act does not apply to prisoners, a finding that Congress
intended to cover prisoners under the FLSA runs contrary to
common sense.
I n any event, instead of raising inmates' standard of living,
the requirement of minimum wages could actually lead to fewer inmates working and earning any wages. In fact, very few
states could afford to pay minimum wages to their working
inmates.13' In all likelihood, states would cut back on inmatework programs rather than incur additional wage expense ~ . ' ~Such
'
a result would defeat Congress's goal of eliminating poor living and working conditions "without substantially
curtailing employment or earning p~wer."'~'
2. Unfair competition
Proponents of FLSA coverage for prisoners most often
point to the unfair competitive advantage which inmate employers gain by paying wages below the statutory minimum.'" Congress likely intended the FLSA to deter employers from trying to make less expensive products through a
strategy of paying low wages. Even so, while less expensive
products may be a by-product, this is not the intent of most
inmate work programs. Indeed, most courts recognize that the
primary intent of the states is to "occupy idle prisoners, reduce
disciplinary problems, nurture a sense of responsibility, and
provide valuable skills and job training."'" With this in
mind, the Ninth Circuit, in Hale II, was willing to acknowledge
138. Hale 11, 993 F.2d at 1396; accord Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 807
n.2 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1303 (1993).
139. "A 1992 study by The Sentencing Project, a nonprofit group that specializes in criminal-justice issues, estimated that jails and prisons cost taxpayers more
than $20 billion a year. . . . 'Corrections is [already] one of the biggest busters of
state budgets now.'" Ed Timms, Prison Boom a Bust: More Inmates, but Not Less
Crime, SALTLAKE TRIB., June 17, 1993, at A1 (quoting Jim Gondles, executive
director of the American Correctional Association); see also T o q , supra note 1, at
395-96 (describing the large "price tag" for building and operating prisons).
140. See supra text accompanying note 121.
141. 29 U.S.C. 8 202(b) (1988). But see Hale 11, 993 F.2d 1387, 1401 n.1 (9th
Cir. 1993) morris, J., dissenting) ("The question [of] Congress' concern with the
harmful effect that cheap labor has on the living standards of all workers [and not
just prisoners] should inform our interpretation of the statute." (emphasis added)).
142. See, e.g., Hale 11, 993 F.2d at 1400, 1403 (Norris, J., dissenting$; Hale I,
967 F.2d 1356, 1363 (9th Cir. 1992), reu'd on reh'g, 993 F.2d 1387 (9th Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 386 (1993).
143. Hale 11, 993 F.2d at 1398; see supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
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that some unfairness would have t o be tolerated to accommodate these compelling interests for putting inmates to
work.
In addition, the advantage of paying sub-minimum wages
is likely offset by added expenses and, in some cases, the lowerquality work-product of prison labor. This is certainly true in
the federal prison system:
[Mlany believe the cost of inmate labor (an average of one
dollar per hour) gives [Federal Prison Industries] an unfair
advantage in the selling prices of products. However, labor
costs in terms of a percent of the selling price are generally
the same as that of most private sector operations manufacturing similar products. The reasons are that we focus on
labor intensive operations, that we hire inmates who have
little work experience, and that there are many ?hiddenn
costs, including prison security, a high ratio of "civilian foremen" to inmate workers, and lost product time resulting from
prison operation requirements.'"

Presumably, state prison programs experience many of the
same difficulties as the federal programs in dealing with an
unskilled labor force which can also represent a security risk.
Furthermore, the courts have failed to consider the costs of
providing food, shelter, and clothing for prisoners as part of
their imputed income. As of 1990, maintaining prisoners in
federal prison cost about $14,000 a year.146The cost to state
prisons likely approaches or exceeds this amount.147Imputing
those costs as income to working inmates could be one way of
getting around the actual payment of minimum wages.
In any event, the prevention of unfair competition, without
other compelling rationale, provides a weak argument for extending FLSA coverage to prisoners. Requiring payment of the
minimum hourly wage to working prisoners would not necessarily solve the problem of unfair competition. In all likelihood,
the average wage in several competing industries already exceeds the statutory minimum. Accordingly, simply requiring

144. See supra text accompanying note 118.
145. Hearings, supra note 4, at 11-12 (statement of J. Michael Quinlan, Director, Federal Bureau of Prisons).
146. Id. at 3 (testimony of Hon. Carlos J. Moorhead).
147. "The annual cost to operate [state] prisons ranges from $15,000 to
$50,000 per prisoner per year, depending on the state." Tonry, supra note 1, at
395; see also supra note 139.
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employers to pay inmate workers minimum wages would alleviate, but not cure, this problem of unfair competition of goods
and labor in the m a r k e t p l a ~ e . 'Since
~ ~ prison work programs
do not experience the same competitive pressures of a free
labor system as do other public or private employers,'" only
requiring payment of the prevailing wage in the industry could
fully solve the problem. In summary, the need to eliminate
unfair competition fails to provide a compelling reason for covering inmates under the FLSA.

C. Congressional Action and Inaction
The question still remains whether the failure of Congress
to exempt prisoners from coverage should be construed as express intent to include prisoners in the Act or as a n oversight
on the part of Congress. Hale I followed the former proposition,l5' while Vanskike followed the latter.l5l Nevertheless,
Congress has not acted to include the coverage of prisoners
during the more than forty years in which the courts have
generally denied it. Congress has had ample opportunity to
amend the FLSA to include a t least prisoners working for private industries, if not those working for the states.
Congress's silence on the matter may be indicative of its
thinking, or lack thereof, concerning FLSA coverage of inmate
workers. One possible interpretation is that Congress has
found the courts' decisions denying coverage to be acceptable.
Certainly, failure to legislatively counter a court decision will
be viewed by some as ratification of that decision.15' Howev-

148. This assumes no extra expenses to employers who use prison labor to
produce their products. But see supra text accompanying note 145.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 107, 114.
150. Supra text accompanying note 86.
151. Supra text accompanying notes 103-104. Compare Mark A. Cunningham,
Recent Development, Watson v. Graves: Locked into Minimum Wage: Fair Labor
Standards Act Coverage of Prison Inmates, 65 TUL.L. REV. 1767, 1775 (1991)
(claiming that the Fifth Circuit's "express holding that inmate status does not
automatically foreclose FLSA coverage resolves the confusion that resulted from
prior case law which either stated or held that Congress did not intend for the
FLSA to apply to work performed by prison inmates" (citations omitted)) with
James J. Maiwurm & Wendy S. Maiwurm, Comment, Minimum Wages for Prisoners: Legal Obstacles and Suggested Reforms, 7 U . MICH. J.L. REF. 193, 212
(1973) (citing FLSA legislative history to support the proposition that Congress did
not intend the FLSA to cover prison inmates).
152. In fact, those who do not favor completely excluding inmates from FLSA
coverage have applied a similar argument. See, e.g., Hale 11, 993 F.2d 1387, 1392
n.8 (9th Cir. 1993) (indicating that because "Congress has amended the FLSA twice

'
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er, congressional inaction may simply represent a desire to
leave the matter to the courts; or, it may result from the fact
that prisoners lack a cohesive and influential lobbying
voice.'53
In any event, some courts believe that Congress's passage
of the Ashurst-Sumners Act1%represented the extent of legislative action the lawmakers intended to take concerning prison
labor.ls5 Congress enacted this particular law to combat "the
evils attending the sale of [prison-made] goods in competition
with goods manufactured and produced by free labor."ls6 Regardless of what Congress intended, "we cannot ignore the fact
that prison industries programs have existed for a long time,
Congress has been aware [of these programs] at least since
passage of the Ashurst-Sumners Act in 1935, and important
penological purposes are served by these program^."'^'
Even so, the best evidence of what Congress may intend
with regard to working state prisoners can be seen in congressional treatment of federal prisoners. Federal prison work programs pay wages well below the statutory minimum.'" If
Congress allows federal prisoners to be paid sub-standard wages, it certainly must not object to state prisoners being paid
sub-standard wages. Unless Congress voices some rationale to
the contrary, it presumably intends similar treatment of federal and state inmates.
D. Public Policy Toward Criminals
The courts have also failed to consider a number of other
public policy concerns regarding prisoners. For example, schol-

a

since [the Carter holding] without taking action to limit [it,] congressional silence
on the applicability of the FLSA to prisoners is some indication of its intent").
153. One commentator has suggested that Congress enacted the FLSA because
the "political elites" conceded to pressures from the working class. RONNIE
STEINBERG,
WAGESAND HOURS 14 (1982). Steinberg believes that the working
class's power to influence government or employers is the result of organized labor.
Id. at 179-81 (claiming that organization begets power and power begets reform).
Since working inmates lack the power to organize to the same extent as private
labor, the inmates also lack the power for reform.
154. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1761-1762 (1988).
155. See Hale 11, 993 F.2d at 1397; Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 812 (7th
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1303 (1993).
156. Hale 11, 993 F.2d at 1397 (quoting S. REP. NO. 906, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1935)).
157. Id. at 1398.
158. See Hearings, supra note 4, at 4, 11-12.
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ars have voiced several policy reasons supporting the imprisonment of criminals, including rehabilitation, incapacitation,
retribution, and deterrence.15'
Rehabilitation of criminals is arguably served by allowing
prisoners to work;160 however, the payment of prisoners for
their labor is usually not considered essential to this goal. The
rehabilitative benefit comes from the job skills acquired, the
responsibility learned, and the self-esteem gained by the inSimilarly, incapacitamate worker through prod~ctivity.'~~
tion is not affected by paying wages to inmate workers. Either
way, the criminal remains incarcerated, hopefully unable to
harm society.
On the other hand, paying prisoners for their labor clearly
contradicts the goal of retribution. Requiring "hard labor" may
be considered part of the criminal sentence.16z In any event,
allowing prisoners to earn even meager wages while living a t
the expense of the state clearly lightens their punishment, a t
least economically.
Even so, a more compelling policy argument against the
payment of minimum or normal wages to prisoners is that such
payment reduces the general and specific deterrent effects of
incarceration. Indeed, Professor James Wilson has recognized
the view that "crime will be more frequently committed if,
other things being equal, crime becomes more profitable compared to other ways of spending one's time."163

159. See JAMES
Q. WILSON,THINKINGABOUT CRIMEpassim (1977).
160. See supra notes 7-8, 143 and accompanying text.
THE WORKETHIC passim (1980).
161. See DAVIDJ. CHERRINGTON,
162. "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. CONST.amend. XIII,
$ 1 (emphasis added); see, e.g., ARJZ. REV. STAT.ANN. $ 31-251(A) (1992) (granting
state official authority to require that each able-bodied prisoner engage in hard
labor).
163. WILSON,supra note 159, at 117. One scholar suggests that a potential
criminal
would compare the hourly wage rate in his best legal occupation compared with the amount he could earn iri his best criminal activity. . . .
[A] major factor in the costs of crime is the opportunity cost of foregone
legal wages. . . . An individual would also consider the direct costs and
occupational expenses associated with crime: the probability of being arrested, of being convicted, and punished.
MORGAN
0.REYNOLDS,
CRIMEBY CHOICE:AN ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS68 (1985). Allowing prisoners to be paid for work in prison reduces this "direct cost" of punishment, increasing the likelihood that an individual will engage in criminal acts.

PRISON LABOR
Paying criminals for their labor while in prison certainly
makes incarceration seem less severe from a n economic standpoint. If criminals know that if they are caught and convicted
they can still have gainful employment while living off the
state, the deterrent effect of imprisonment is seriously
weakened.164 Accordingly, increasing the wages of working
inmates to the statutorily required minimum would further
increase the likelihood that a person will undertake crime for
its potential economic benefits.
This proposition seems especially true in light of evidence
that crimes are more likely to be committed by unemployed
persons who would stand to benefit economically from either
Also, substanperpetrating crime or prison employ~nent.'~~
tially more property crimes are committed annually than violent crimes,'66 further indicating a possible connection between criminal behavior and the need for property or economic
gain.

Several scholars have developed models to support this economic hypothesis on
a much more complex and scientific level. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Crime and
Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J . POL. ECON. 169 (1968); Sheldon
Danziger & David Wheeler, The Economics of Crime: Punishment or Income Redistribution, 33 REV. SOC.ECON.113 (1975); Isaac Ehrlic, Participation in Illegitimate
Activities: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation, 8 1 J . POL.ECON.521 (1973).
Indeed such views were espoused more than a century ago: "[Mlen will resort to
plunder whenever plunder is easier than work. History shows this quite clearly.
And under these conditions, neither religion nor morality can stop it." FREDERIC
BASTIAT,THE LAW10 (Dean Russell trans., 1950) (1850).
164. This analysis obviously ignores other psychological viewpoints on criminal
behavior. See generally WILSON,supra note 159, a t 47-70. Certainly, mentally unstable individuals will be less likely to consider the economic prospects of criminal
behavior. Nevertheless, "[tlhe evidence supports the idea that criminals are rational
supra note 163, a t 75.
and responsible for their own behavior." REYNOLDS,
A similar economic theory underlies much of the rationale behind tort liability
as well. See
PAGEKEETONET AL., PROSSER AND KEETONON THE LAWOF ! ~ X ~ T S
25-26 (5th ed. 1984). The theory is that "[a] reasonable person will take care to
avoid a n accident as long a s the cost of taking care is less than the cost of the
accident to that person. Accident cost is a function of the gravity of the harm the
accident will cause . . . and the probability that the accident will happen." Sharon
E. Conaway, Comment, The Continuing Search for Solutions to the Drinking Driver
Tragedy and the Problem of Social Host Liability, 82 NW. U . L. REV. 403, 420
n.111 (1988).
H. MCGAGHY,CRIMEIN AMERICANSOCIETY 65 (1980); RICH165. See CHARLES
ARD QUINNEY,CLASS,STATE,AND CRIME:ON THE THEORYAND PRACTICEOF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
50-60 (1977).
166. Reynolds claims that "over 90 percent of the crimes recorded by the police
supm note 163, a t 68; see also CRIME
involve thefts and robberies." REYNOLDS,
REPORTS,supra note 2, at 5.

w.
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Certainly Congress has considered this in its regulation of
Federal Prison Industries and other prison work programs
which still pay sub-minimum wages to inmates. Congress could
not approve a program which would so strongly undermine
public policy towards criminals while only marginally furthering the goals of the FLSA??

VI. A NEWTESTFOR ECONOMIC
REALITY
I n light of the fact that Congress likely did not, and would
not, intend for the Fair Labor Standards Act to cover working
prisoners i n a majority of cases, the courts must find a way to
interpret the Act in a logical and consistent manner. The Supreme Court has held that the coverage of any given relationship hinges on the "economic reality'' of the employment situation.lq Several courts have developed tests for determining
the "economic reality" of the employment situation, but the
Ninth Circuit's Bonnette test has become the most p0pu1ar.l~~
In addition to the Ninth Circuit, the Second17' and Fifth
Circ~its'~'
have apparently also adopted the test.
Even so, the Bonnette test is flawed, failing to adequately
recognize "economic reality" in several situations. Applied literally, most inmate workers would gain coverage under the
FLSA. This is because the Bonnette test really only focuses on
whether the employer (or group of employers) perform employer-like functions over the inmate worker. The inmate is
held to be an employee by virtue of the entity paying the wages
being held to be a n employer. However, this does not always
comport with reality.'"
Accordingly, this Comment proposes a new test which
considers both the employer and employee sides of the relationship: a n employee covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act is a
person who, (1) while free to sell his or her labor to another

167. See the text accompanying notes 143-144 for a brief discussion of other
compelling policies which require inmates to work.
168. Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., Inc., 366 U.S.28, 33 (1961).
169. See supra text accompanying notes 48-51.
170. Carter v. Dutchess Community College, 735 F.2d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1984).
171. Watson v. Graves, 909 F.2d 1549, 1554-55 (5th Cir. 1990).
172. See Hale 11, 993 F.2d 1387, 1394 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that the
Bonnette factors do not provide a useful framework in the case of prisoners who
are statutorily required to work); Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 809 (7th-Cir.
1992) (stating that the Bonnette factors presuppose a free labor situation which
does not exist), cert. denied, 113 S . Ct. 1303 (1993).
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party (2) in reasonable expectation of standard compensation,
(3) provides services for or on behalf of a party (4) who has
power to hire or fire the person, (5) who supervises and controls the person while working, and (6) who determines the
rate and method of payment to the person.
Under this test, workers must be free to sell their service~~~~and must reasonably expect compensation.
Three
Bonnette factors are still included to determine who the actual
employer is.175Clearly, this test more closely reflects the economic reality of a true employer-employee relationship.
Under the test, inmate workers could never be employees
of the state or prison for FLSA purposes. Inmates are not truly
free to sell their labor to a party who not only can decide the
terms of their employment but also can govern their entire
daily routine. In other words, the state's "control over [an inmate] does not stem from any remunerative relationship or
bargained-for exchange of labor for consideration, but from
incarceration itself."176 "[Tlhe economic reality of [this] relationship . . . lies in the relationship between prison and prisonThis
~ is especially true
er. It is penological, not p e ~ u n i a r y . " ' ~
when inmates are required by state statute to work, but it
applies equally to any situation in which the state or prison
can establish the terms of employment or pays the inmate
worker.17'

173. Steinberg contends that, though the contrary may seem true, freedom of
contract was the source of the FLSA's philosophical foundation. STEINBERG,
supra
note 153, at 8.
174. This requirement would eliminate the possibility of volunteer workers
later trying to demand payment from those on behalf of whom they volunteered
their services. In addition, inmates would have no reasonable grounds for expecting
minimum wages from the prison or state. If the employer is private, the result
may change.
175. Bonnette's fourth factor, the keeping of employment records, should never
be a dispositive factor. However, the fact that records are kept for a particular
individual may provide valuable extrinsic evidence when other factors do not
clearly point to one employer or another.
176. Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 809-10 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 1303 (1993).
177. Hale 11, 993 F.2d 1387, 1395 (9th Cir. 1993).
178. The situation in which it is easiest to conceive of an inmate who could be
held to be an employee under FLSA involves an inmate who has been given permission to contract with outside employers on a work-release basis. However, these
situations are relatively few in comparison to all inmate labor situations.
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VII. CONCLUSION

While some courts seem likely to extend FLSA coverage to
prisoners in several cases, the courts' actions are not supported
by the Act or by congressional intent. Congress's inaction towards state prisoners and the FLSA should be viewed as approval of the traditional denial of coverage by the courts until
1984. In addition, competing policies regarding treatment of
prisoners makes it unlikely that Congress would approve of
such coverage, even today. Unless Congress or the Supreme
Court provides more specific guidance, the courts should apply
this Comment's proposed test for economic reality.

James K.Haslam

